Article A green economy manifesto

Deadly fallout from a mining company reaping profits over people

A deadly wildcat strike at the Lonmin platinum mine near Marikana in South Africa left 45 people dead and scores more injured. The devastating impact of the strike on all affected parties reverberated throughout the country and gave rise to more questions than answers.

This article is co-authored by Madi Hanekom and Cathy Dippnall

The tragic events that unfolded at South Africa’s third largest platinum mine, the Lonmin platinum mine in Marikana in the North West Province, between Saturday 11 August and Thursday 16 August, 2012 are a heart breaking stain on the history of post-apartheid South Africa. Forty five people lost their lives as a direct result of the tragic occurrence at this mine.

And the fallout thereof has, and is still, reverberating throughout the country. What happened at Marikana is believed to be the single most lethal use of force by the South African Police Service (SAPS) against civilians since the Sharpeville killings in 1960 when the police mowed down 69 unarmed black people and injured 180 others for refusing to carry the dompas identity document required for blacks during the apartheid years.

Events leading up to the massacre at Marikana and the aftermath

There is no consensus amongst the main role players (miners, Lonmin management, mineworkers’ unions, SA government and SAPS) as to the full spectrum of issues which gave rise to the Marikana massacre and exactly who was to blame. However, during that time several mines in the platinum belt had work stoppages, but it was the Lonmin miners who were the first to go on strike for higher wages. They were also encouraged by the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) who was challenging the power and dominance that the ANC aligned National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) had on organised labour.

But all parties are in agreement that a wage increase demand from some of Lonmin’s AMCU-aligned workers on 9 August 2012 was the trigger point that lit the fuse for the violence, injury and death that followed.

Embarking on the strike

The miners were demanding an entry-level salary of R12 500 (about £981) per month at a time that rock drill operators were taking home less than R5 000 (about £392) a month. This increase would have constituted approximately triple what they were earning monthly at the time.

Lonmin management refused and, as the miners had not gone through the correct bargaining structures, they could not strike legally. After several weeks of stoppages, many of the miners embarked on a wild-cat strike on Friday 10 August 2012.

To aggravate matters even further, this coincided with a period of dissent between the miners and the leadership of the NUM in the area. A leadership vacuum was also identified, as seen in the dissent between the miners and the leadership of the NUM workers in the area. And with NUM allegedly incorrectly advising drill operators about the wage negotiations, and the AMCU perceived inability to control their members, the scene was set for a massive showdown.

A major shift also occurred at this time in union membership. Although NUM was the majority union in most of the country’s mining sector at the time, in Marikana, AMCU was slowly but surely increasing its membership and starting to take control of the strike.

Joseph Mathunjwa, president of AMCU, is captured on video as saying to the striking workers: “We do not want bloodshed; we want your problems solved so you get your salaries, comrades.” But bloodshed is what they got in the end.

During this tense period various political and industrial heads intervened to try and calm the situation, but to no avail.

The violence erupts

Over the next few days (10 – 15 August) the strike was marred by incidents of intimidation and the brutal attack of some of the miners who dared report for duty. This set the tone for the violence that followed. Lonmin called in the SAPS who put an operation in place to disarm angry miners (who were brandishing traditional and other weapons) and defuse the volatile situation.

In the ensuing clashes, mine employees, mine workers and police officers were killed; in total eight died during this time. These horrific events left the country reeling in shock and disbelief. But worse was to come.

During this period the miners gathered daily on a small hill called Wonderkop to discuss strategy. A Sangoma (traditional healer/muti man), believed to be from the Eastern Cape, was called in by the miners to provide them with muti, called “intelezi”, to give them courage and make them invincible in any battle. This Sangoma also allegedly provided them with further muti to make the miners invisible to police bullets.

Six days into the strike, on 16 August, during what appeared initially to have been a peaceful march by the strikers with police apparently just monitoring the situation, the march took a turn for the worse when Major General Zondasi William Mpembe (North West Province deputy police commissioner) received a ‘mysterious’ phone call. The question arises: Who was on the other end of the line and did this person give sanction for the police to take the tactical “D-Day” action that followed? And what led police management to decide this was D-Day, with its rationale that, instead of waiting another day to execute their original plan of surrounding and disarming the relatively few main strikers early in the morning, they would disperse, disarm and make arrests that afternoon, when the crowd numbered in the thousands - with bloodshed an inevitable result?

We may never know who the mysterious caller was, but the Marikana Commission of Inquiry into the massacre later found North West provincial commissioner (now retired) Lieutenant-General Zukiswa Mbobo, to be the one who made the final decision to implement the D-Day plan on 16 August after an extraordinary meeting of the police national management forum the evening of 15 August. The report says this decision was “the decisive cause of the 34 deaths” on August 16 and which made operational commanders cobble together a plan to implement the tactical plan.

So, what did Lonmin management do while the strike was heating up? Just two days before the massacre Mbombo met with Lonmin’s executive vice president, human relations and external affairs, Barnard Mokoena and other participants to discuss the crisis.

The meeting, which was recorded by Lonmin, was eventually presented to the Commission and revealed the chilling thoughts between Lonmin and the police about the worsening situation and the political forces at play. This was with reference to violent strikes at the Impala platinum mine and the perceived views that the mining company and police were supporting the strikers’ efforts to get rid of the NUM and installing AMCU in its place.

It was during this discussion that the D-Day term was also used by Mokoena. “Let tomorrow (15 August) be the D-Day where we issue the ultimatum and say if you do not show up for work, sorry, that is it.”

The ultimatum only served to incite the strikers’ indignation further, leading to a bloody between strikers and police, with the latter brutally shooting down miners with live ammunition to suppress the strike. Police insisted that they fired in self-defence. Videos of the shootings tell a story of excessive force being used by police against miners but it is also true that the Marikana Commission of Inquiry later found that the Lonmin workers can be seen very clearly on videos and photographs being in possession of dangerous weapons at the public gatherings or in public places.

And, as is so often the case in mass violent situations, it is difficult to definitively identify who are the instigators and perpetrators of violence and who are the innocent, or whether there was culpability from both sides.

National Police Commissioner, General Riah Phiyega, subsequently confirmed on 17 August that 34 people were killed, 78 injured, and 259 arrested by the police during this tragic encounter. The eventual death toll of the strike was 45.

The aftermath

After the massacre, authorities, politicians and Lonmin mine management scuttled around to try and figure out what had caused the Marikana platinum belt to blow up in the way it did. But it would take a long time before some answers started emerging; answers not necessarily believed by everybody, and certainly not by the affected miners and their families.

The following dates provide the narrative of what the government, Lonmin mine and its workers, families of the slain and injured miners, and the courts focussed on after the massacre []:

23 August 2012, The country observes a national day of mourning in respect of the deaths at Marikana.

30 August 2012, Authorities charge 270 arrested workers with the murder of their colleagues shot on 16 August.

3 September 2012, Court withdraws murder charges against the 270 people detained in the aftermath of the massacre and the first batch of workers is released from custody.

18 September 2012, Workers at Marikana secure pay increases of between 11 and 22%, and agree to end the strike.

20 September 2012, As the Marikana miners return to work, unrest continues at Amplats mines in Rustenburg, where workers demand similar pay raises to those won by the Lonmin miners.

1 October 2012, The Marikana Commission of Inquiry into the 16 August killings opens in Rustenburg.

17 June 2013, A cleansing ceremony is held in Marikana by the families of those killed during illegal strikes at Lonmin’s platinum mine.

14 August 2013, Lonmin and AMCU sign an agreement recognizing the latter as the majority union at the mine.

25 June 2015, The Marikana Commission’s report is released.

31 July 2015, National Police Commissioner, Phiyega, submits her report to President Zuma to motivate why she should keep her job. (The Marikana Commission recommended that she face an inquiry into her fitness to hold office.)

11 August 2015, Families of 37 of the South African miners killed file civil claims in the Pretoria High Court against the minister of police; miners injured also file claims.

The bodies of 34 men were flown back to their homes in the adjacent countries and rural areas of South Africa, for burial. The loss of the family bread winners was devastating to many of the families and left many children orphaned - and wives widowed, with little or no means of providing for the basic necessities such as food and clothes.

And in a curious twist of fate, the Sangoma implicated in having performed the rituals to assist the protesting Lonmin mineworkers, is gunned down by unknown assailant(s) on 25 March 2013.

Despite the findings of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, for many people there are still no clear answers and no definitive agreement seems to have been reached among affected parties, as to what caused the massacre and who should accept responsibility. The Commission did put forward extensive findings on the actions of key role players and made recommendations as to the follow-up actions required.

Findings of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry

After the massacre President Jacob Zuma acted on 23 August 2012 to appoint the Marikana Commission of Inquiry [], led by retired Judge Ian Gordon Farlam, assisted by Advocates PD Hemraj SC and BR Tokota SC, with a mandate “to investigate matters of public, national and international concern arising out of the tragic incidents at Marikana.”

The Commission was specifically tasked to enquire into and make findings and recommendations concerning the conduct of Lonmin, SAPS, AMCU, NUM, the Department of Mineral Resources and other government departments, as well as individuals and groupings.

The Commission’s findings were eventually released in a 600-page report on 25 June 2015, after a long drawn-out three-year investigation characterised by denials of accountability and blame-laying and costing South African taxpayers a total of R153 million. []

Main findings and recommendations of the Commission

Some of the main findings of the Commission were against Lonmin, AMCU, NUM, the police, some individual miners, and addressed accusations levelled at Cyril Ramaphosa (at the time of the massacre, a non-executive director of Lonmin and now Deputy President of South Africa.

Against Lonmin: The mine did not use its best endeavours to resolve the disputes; did not respond appropriately to the threat of, and the outbreak of violence; failed to employ sufficient safeguards and measures to ensure the safety of its employees; insisted that non-striking employees should return to work despite being in no position to protect them from attacks by strikers; under-performed on its undertaking with regard to its Social and Labour plans (SLP).

Against AMCU: Officials of AMCU did not exercise effective control over AMCU members and supporters in ensuring that their conduct was lawful and did not endanger the lives of others; sang provocative songs and made inflammatory remarks, aggravating an already volatile situation. The Commission noted that AMCU President, Joseph Mathunjwa, did his best before the shootings to persuade the strikers to lay down their arms and leave the koppie.

Against NUM: The union did not exercise its best endeavours to resolve the dispute between itself and the strikers; wrongly advised rock drill operators that no negotiations with Lonmin were possible until the end of the two year wage agreement; did not take the initiative to persuade and enable Lonmin to speak to the workers; failed to exercise effective control over its membership in ensuring that their conduct was lawful and did not endanger the lives of others; encouraged and assisted non-striking workers to go to the shafts in circumstances where there was a real danger that they would be killed or injured by armed strikers.

Against the SAPS: The Commission found that the police operation should not have taken place on the 16th August because of defects in its tactical plan and that it would have been impossible to disarm and disperse the strikers without significant bloodshed on the afternoon of the 16th; the SAPS should have waited till the next day when the original plan to encircle and remove the strikers could have been implemented as a substantially risk free alternative; the operation should have been stopped after the shooting at scene one of the fight and that there was also a complete lack of command and control by police at scene two; the Commission queried the conduct of police leadership during the inquiry as they did not initially disclose vital information. Against these findings it is shocking to note that, during the time that it took for the Commission to do its work, General Phiyega strongly defended the police action, inter alias stating: “Let us take note of the fact that, whatever happened represents the best of responsible policing.” In her opinion, therefore, the police was only doing their jobs.

Against Cyril Ramaphosa: Legal counsel for injured and arrested persons alleged that Ramaphosa was the cause of the massacre as he sent e-mails 24 hours before the massacre calling for “concomitant action” against “criminals” to be taken by the police, and that he must therefore be held accountable for the death of 34 miners. The Commission however found that the accusations against him were groundless.

Against some individual strikers: Individual strikers and loose groupings of strikers promoted a situation of conflict and confrontation which gave rise, directly or indirectly, to the deaths of Lonmin’s security guards and non-striking workers, and endangered the lives of the non-striking workers who were not injured.

The Commission’s recommendations included that Lonmin’s failure to comply with its housing obligations under the SLP needs to be addressed by the Department of Mineral Resources which should take steps to enforce Lonmin’s obligations in this respect. The ways that Public Order Policing is dealt with need to be reviewed and revised by a panel of experts and a number of further recommendations relating to the operation of the police were put forward, including appropriate training of police, development of a protocol for communications during large operations, equipping of police helicopters with functional cameras, provision of adequate and speedy first aid to those who are injured during operations, and the demilitarization and professionalizing of the police.

The report’s recommendations furthermore included major changes to be effected to the responsiveness of the police service, that an inquiry be held on the fitness to hold office of both the National Police Commissioner and North West Police to hold office, and that the killings and assaults be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions for further investigation. The Commission also called for a further investigation of offences, in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act and the Possession of Dangerous Weapons Act, due to the propensity in South Africa for people carrying sharp instruments and firearms.

Where do the findings and recommendations of the Commission leave us?

Some people believe that the report succeeded only in opening up festering wounds of indignation, despair and anger and did very little to bring definitively to light what caused the massacre, who was responsible and who should therefore be held accountable, how to support the injured and families of the workers killed and how to ensure that such tragedy never occur again.

And it remains to be seen if, and to what extent, the recommendations of the Marikana Commission will be implemented.

Is it a case of profits over people for the mining houses?

Do the bosses in the mining sector really understand what the issues are that shape the daily living conditions and belief systems of their workers? Or is their chief concern to ensure that they remain at the helm of hugely profitable businesses while employing cheap labour living in abject squalor? To what extent do workers’ dismal living conditions and low wages contribute to strike action?

Workers’ dismal living conditions and wages

The majority of the workers who were killed at Marikana were the sole breadwinners and supported large extended families on their meagre income with an estimated total of 326 dependents reliant on these deceased workers’ wages. The terrible conditions in which mine workers live in the Marikana area were highlighted by the Commission. The housing shortage for mine workers, many of whom live in shacks was believed to be one of the motivating factors behind the 2012 strike. []

Their homes are simple shacks made from corrugated iron, wood and cardboard. Even though there is a huge power station near Nkaneng, which serves Lonmin’s operation, there is no electricity in the settlement where thousands live. Water is sourced from one of the public taps placed sporadically around the community. Many of the standpipes have been dry since 2013 and locals murmur that a R900 payment to the right person will ensure a reconnection. It is a serious indictment against Lonmin that, by June 2015 only three “show houses” for mine workers were completed by Lonmin during the six years, from 2005 to 2011, in which it promised to build 5 500 units for its employees in fulfilment of its SLP obligations.

Lonmin blithely ignored these obligations, which were meant to compel mining companies to address structural problems within the mining sector, including the dehumanising migrant labour system, which breaks up nuclear families and contributes to social divisions. Its then transformation committee chairperson, Cyril Ramaphosa, exercised oversight of Lonmin’s SLP obligations, but professed at the Commission to not having read the reports and being unaware of the mine’s failures in this regard.

At the Inquiry, former Lonmin chief operating officer, Mohamed Seedat, conceded under cross-examination that housing conditions at Marikana were “truly appalling”. He also conceded that the mine’s board and executive had, post facto, recognised the link between the critical shortage of affordable housing and the 2012 strike. With the Commission recommendation of an investigation into Lonmin’s failure to fulfil its obligations to build the houses, it can be expected that the fulfilment of the obligations will be fundamental to the mine retaining its South African platinum group metal mining rights.

A huge factor in strikes always remain the quest from miners to be paid a decent wage by the exceedingly wealthy mine owners and management. Labour amounts to about 60% of Lonmin’s costs. The vast disparity in earnings between workers and bosses is also an enormous bone of contention and will remain so for the foreseeable future. And added to this is that most of the workers tend to be indebted to loan sharks and unscrupulous companies who sell goods to these workers on credit, full well knowing that they cannot afford to repay these loans. The impact of emolument attachment orders (often called garnishee orders) which are court orders that force employers to deduct money owed to a creditor from their employees’ monthly salary further impoverish them and exploit their lack of financial literacy. The use of this kind of order is currently being challenged in court.

The impact of workers’ traditional belief systems

It is doubtful whether mine management has any in-depth understanding of the traditional belief systems of migrant workers, including the carrying of traditional weapons. While Western thinking scoffs at tribalism and cultural beliefs the reality is that many workers in the mining and metal industry in South Africa are migrant labourers from rural areas, and in Lonmin’s case, from the impoverished Eastern Cape and rural areas of KwaZulu Natal where tribal practices are commonplace. In fact tribalism, encouraged during the apartheid era has been reintroduced by the current ANC government.

So it is not surprising that the striking miners at Marikana would employ a Sangoma or muti man to protect them, making them strong, invisible to police and impervious to firearms. It is this ‘bravado’ bought at great cost (often with loans) that was part of the miners’ downfall.

To say that Lonmin management and the police were unaware of tribal practices seems improbable given the long history of tribalism and inter-tribal clashes during South Africa’s long mining history. The question is – was the call for the D-Day operation done knowingly – that once corralled on the koppie the miners could be “dispersed” easily?

The impact on the economy

It is well understood that current global adverse economic issues, as well as issues specific to the South African situation such as the high price of electricity, maintenance stoppages and labour disputes, are affecting the ability of the mines to operate at sustained levels of profitability and are presently causing substantial job losses in the sector.

The impact of the Lonmin strike should also be seen within the context of the importance of platinum as a precious metal resource and its substantial contribution to the overall earnings of the mining sector as well as to the economy of South Africa as a whole. Platinum – because of its scarcity is called “rich man’s gold” and the breakdown in supply would catapult the price of platinum into orbit. The importance of platinum mining to the South African economy cannot be over emphasised as it is the largest global producer, mining approximately 88 percent of the world’s reserves of platinum.

Strikes have a dire impact on the economy. At the height of the Marikana strike, Lonmin says it has lost six days or 15 000 ounces of platinum at Marikana and was unlikely to meet its full-year production target of 750 000 ounces regardless of issuing striking workers with an ultimatum that they return to work or face dismissal. And on 17 August 2012, Lonmin shares dropped by almost five percent in London and four percent in Johannesburg following news of the massacre.

The Lonmin mineworkers’ strike subsequently triggered strikes at other mines operated by Anglo American Platinum (a separate company) in this province and is viewed by many as the major strike, to date, that threatened to destabilise the lucrative mining sector in this part of South Africa with potential serious repercussions for the rest of the mining industry in the country.

The result of strikes reportedly cost the country more than R4.5bn (£335m), raising insurance against default on the country’s debt and scared some foreign investors into selling their mining shares. When news of the Marikana wage agreement was made public, the spot platinum price fell 2% to a session low at $1,627.49/oz and the rand firmed against the dollar.

And the broader economy in South Africa is haemorrhaging jobs at an alarming rate with the mining sector no exception. Estimated jobs losses at Lonmin within the next few months could reach 6000 due to bearish markets and rising costs in the sector. This is equal to a jobs blood bath and will have further far reaching negative impact on the miners and their families.

But, surely, taking care of its workers in an equitable way should be a priority for mines and that workable solutions need to be found to deal with adverse economic situations? Mining companies cannot argue that they are not well versed in addressing the cyclical nature of the industry. Says Mathunjwa: “The retrenchment of so many people in mining is an attempt by the captains of industry to get rid of AMCU at the mines.” He continues: “Jobs are being destroyed in the industry because government is putting investors first, before the economy and the people, and South Africa is becoming the capital of unemployment.” Talks are currently under way between Lonmin and the unions regarding the envisaged retrenchments.

It is clear that solutions will have to be found to avert another Marikana-type disaster. Therefore if it’s profits over people, mining companies will continue to ignore warnings and only after calamity will they be forced to do something …once the hullabaloo has died down will they just continue to do as little to effect change as possible except make more profits?

Mining operations have serious climate change risks for local communities

A further serous issue is impacting on the ability of mines to operate and to look after their workers properly.

The report from the International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM), Adapting to a changing climate: implications to the metals and mining industry (March 2013) states that “There is a growing awareness that unless the mining sector understands the impact of climate change, its impact could represent a physical risk to mining operations.”

Mining and metal extraction is heavily dependent on water and energy for processing, both of which can be extremely sensitive to climate changes. Adding to these direst risks to climate exposure, many of the other sustainable development pressures faced by the sector are also climate sensitive.

According to the report an example of the pressures facing the mining and metals sector is gaining and maintaining a social licence to operate, which is critical to preventing disputes that delay projects or cause existing operations to be halted. This may be more challenging when climate change has a negative effect on local communities.

These communities may themselves be susceptible to climate change threats from human health impacts, the availability of water and from other climate-sensitive industries nearby such as agriculture. These risks may impact workforce availability economic growth and social development in these communities. In turn these risks can jeopardize companies’ operations and reputations in areas that are sensitive to climate change.

“The implications to land and water use in the mining and metals industry – both of which are important to management of risks from a changing climate are distinct from other climate-sensitive industries. The sector recognizes that implications of any human activity can ripple out across an ecosystem, and effective risk management, as well as realisation of stewardship opportunities to positively contribute to ecosystem health demands, an ecosystem perspective that is inevitably unique to every location,” reports ICMM. It also state that pollution and ineffective waste management can also significantly impact the environment and surrounding communities and that the mining and mineral sector need to carefully measure the levels of pollution and waste so that action can be taken to reduce impacts.

Mining companies would have to take due cognisance of the findings of this report. And, as in Lonmin’s case, where the Marikana Commission found that the mining company had not adhered to its SLP obligations to build adequate housing and many miners still live in informal housing with no direct access to water and electricity, raises the question as to whether the impact of climate change on living conditions for miners will even be considered. Poor sanitation, lack of running water and electricity continue to add to the miner’s frustrations that their wellbeing is being exploited for profit over people.

What is the way forward?

The last chapter in the Marikana Massacre is yet to be written. But a new phase may start to emerge should the recommendations of the Report be implemented as a matter of priority.

This is especially true for the recommendation that all the killings and assaults that took place during the strike, should be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, for further investigation and to determine whether there is a basis for prosecution, the changes required to be made by the police service in the way they operate, as well as that Lonmin should be held accountable to implement its SLP obligations. Also, South Africa is awaiting, with bated breath, the decision of President Zuma as to whether he will retain National Police Commissioner Phiyega in her post.

Civil action remains an option for the families of the deceased and injured miners. Just days before the third anniversary of the Marikana massacre, on 11 August 2015, families of 37 of the South African miners killed during the wildcat strike at Lonmin have filed civil claims against the minister of police, Nkosinathi Nhleko, in the Pretoria High Court. Lawyers for the injured miners have also filed 30 civil claims of their own. The families of the Lonmin security guards killed as well as those of the cops killed, are also still waiting for answers.

The country is also waiting to see how the government will react to the court challenges by the families of these workers. Will government executives apologise for their role in the massacre to go some way towards healing the wounds? Will the SAPS be able to reassure South Africans that violence/strikes will not be met with extreme violence from the side of the police – are they trained to defuse such situations without major bloodshed? Where does the rule of law come in? The Commission’s Report and the civil claims currently in the courts should give the government pause for thought and an opportunity to right the wrongs, and to communicate this in a clear way to everybody concerned, including the public.

According to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) research paper released in November 2013, the massacre at Marikana was a catalyst and political tipping point for change in the country’s political economy. The paper states that “that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between labour tensions and mining investment attractiveness, controlling for commodity price increases and corruption. It also finds that the institutional context in South Africa’s mining sector currently creates incentives for unions to value violence and unprotected strikes over co-operation.”

There is no doubt that this terrible conflict in the mining sector at Marikana seriously damaged the image of President Jacob Zuma and the ANC, who were seen as being slow and ineffective in their responses. They continue to face accusations that they neglected poor workers and sided with wealthy business owners.

And what are the chances of this type of massacre occurring again, in either the mining or other sectors of the South African economy? Some hope comes from President Zuma’s media briefing on 11 August 2015, wherein he said that he is in discussion with the ministers whose portfolios are affected by the Marikana report, such as police, labour, mineral resources, as well as justice and correctional services. “All interventions are aimed at ensuring that such an incident never occurs again in our country,” he said.

What has, however, clearly emerged from the Marikana massacre is the narrative of a catastrophe that arose out of the deep fault lines in South Africa’s rather fragile democracy, the deepening scourge of enduring poverty and a more than twenty year old unfulfilled promise by politicians of a better life for all.

Additional sources:

Harvey, R. November 2013. Marikana as a tipping point? The political economy of labour tensions in South Africa’s mining industry and how best to resolve them. South African Institute of International Affairs, Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, Occasional Paper no 164.

Mail & Guardian, 25 June 2015 []

Marikana Support Campaign, Press Release: The Marikana Report is Released, 25 June2015. []

Speech. 25 June 2015. Release by President Jacob Zuma of the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the events at the Marikana Mine in Rustenburg, Union Buildings, Pretoria. []

International Council of Mining and Minerals. March 2013. Adapting to a changing climate: implications to the metals and mining industry. []

Vronsky. 1 May 1997. Platinum, the rich man’s gold. []

Video links:

· [] Rehad Desai (Director, Icarus Films)

· [] Rehad Desai (Director, Icarus Films)

· [] Miners Shot Down + Q&A with Director Rehad Desai

· [] Miners Shot Down, The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA)

Photo credit: SABC

This article is a response to the topic idea; Profits shouldn't matter more than people.

How this article was made

  • 3750 points
  • 54 backers
  • 3 drafts
  • 1 comment
Creative Commons License

Also in this issue